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Security Insights · Encrypted file sharing · 8 min read

End-to-End Encrypted File Sharing: How It Works and What to Ask

End-to-end encrypted file sharing explained: how it differs from encryption in transit and at rest, what to ask a provider, and the trade-offs to expect.

File sharing services often describe themselves as encrypted. Usually that means two things: the connection is protected while a file travels, and the provider encrypts the file on its own storage. Both help, but in both cases the provider holds the keys and can read the file.

This guide explains what makes file sharing truly end-to-end encrypted, how it differs from encryption in transit and at rest, which questions to ask a provider, and the trade-offs. For the general concept, see our overview of end-to-end encryption.

What is end-to-end encrypted file sharing?

End-to-end encrypted file sharing means a file is encrypted on the sender's device and decrypted only on the devices of the people it is shared with. The service in between stores and delivers ciphertext and never holds the keys, so it can't read the file on the network, in storage or while it is being shared.

Why "encrypted in transit and at rest" isn't end to end

Encryption in transit usually means TLS, the protocol behind HTTPS. RFC 8446, the TLS 1.3 specification, describes the primary goal of TLS as a secure channel between two communicating peers, and says data sent over that channel is only visible to the endpoints. When you upload a file to a sharing service, the endpoints are your device and the provider's server. TLS protects the file on the network, and the server receives it in readable form.

Encryption at rest comes next: the provider encrypts the file on its storage with keys it manages. That protects against stolen disks and some storage breaches, but the provider's systems decrypt the file whenever they serve, index or preview it. The Australian Signals Directorate's Information Security Manual (ISM) treats both as layers of defense. It also notes that encryption doesn't reduce the sensitivity or classification of data; it reduces the immediate consequences if malicious actors access it.

End-to-end encryption closes the gap between those layers. The file stays encrypted from the sender's device, across the network and the provider's storage, until a recipient's device decrypts it.

Encryption in transit, at rest and end to end compared

The four common models differ in where files are decrypted and who holds the keys.

TLS in transit onlyProvider-encrypted at restCustomer-managed keysEnd-to-end encrypted
Protected on the networkYesYes, with TLSYes, with TLSYes, and encrypted before TLS is applied
Protected on the provider's storageNoYesYesYes
Who holds the keysYour device and the provider's server share session keysThe providerThe customer, through a key service the provider's systems useThe sender and recipients
Where files are readableThe provider's servers and storageThe provider's serversThe provider's servers, with the customer's keyOnly the sender's and recipients' devices
Can the provider read files?YesYesYes, while the key is enabledNo
Server-side previews and searchAvailableAvailableAvailableNot on the server
Lost user credentialsThe provider restores accessThe provider restores accessThe provider or customer restores accessDepends on recovery set up in advance

Customer-managed keys let an organization disable a key and cut off access, which is a useful control. In most designs, though, the service still decrypts files on its servers while the key is enabled. Only the end-to-end model keeps the provider out of the contents.

How end-to-end encrypted sharing works

Each file gets its own random key, which encrypts the file on the sender's device. To share it, the sender's device encrypts that file key with each recipient's public key, and the server stores those small encrypted copies alongside the file. A recipient's device uses its private key to recover the file key, then decrypts the file. NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 calls this key transport and notes that the encrypted key can be stored for later decryption with the private key. Our guide to zero-knowledge encryption walks through the steps in more detail.

The provider's job is to store ciphertext, deliver it, and control who can fetch which encrypted key. It never needs the file key itself. That is why the keys matter as much as the algorithm: NIST SP 800-57 compares keys to the combination of a safe, which gives no protection once an adversary knows it.

Questions to ask an encrypted file sharing service

Product pages rarely spell these out, so ask for the answers in writing.

  1. Who holds the keys? If the provider, a provider-run key server or an escrow service can decrypt files, the service isn't end-to-end encrypted. Ask whether any key that can open files ever leaves users' devices in readable form.
  2. Where does decryption happen? It should happen on the recipient's device or in their browser, not on the provider's servers.
  3. How does sharing with outside people work? External recipients need a key of their own. Some services ask them to create an account so their device can generate a key pair. Others put a key in the share link, which means anyone who obtains the full link can open the file.
  4. What happens on revocation? Revoking access should stop the person fetching the file or its key from then on. No service can pull back a copy already downloaded and decrypted, so ask whether you can share view-only with downloads turned off.
  5. Are previews generated on the server? A server can only build thumbnails or document previews from files it can read. Server-side previews mean the server sees the plaintext at some point.
  6. What can the provider still see? End-to-end encryption protects content, not every detail around it. NIST's definition of end-to-end encryption notes that routing information remains visible, and RFC 8446 notes that TLS doesn't hide the length of the data it transmits. Ask whether file names, sizes, timestamps and sharing relationships are visible to the server.

The trade-offs of end-to-end encryption

End-to-end encryption moves work from the server to the device. That has costs worth knowing before you choose a service.

  • Search. A server can't index words in files it can't read. End-to-end encrypted services usually limit server-side search to information the server can see, or search on the device after decryption.
  • Previews. Viewers have to run on the device or in the browser after the file is decrypted. That can be slower for large files and can limit which formats a service displays.
  • Recovery. If a user loses the credentials that protect their keys, the provider can't simply reset access to the files. NIST SP 800-57 notes that encrypted information can't be turned back into plaintext if the decryption key is lost, and it weighs key recovery as a trade-off between continuity of operations and the risk of exposing keys. Recovery keys or administrator recovery solve this, at the cost of another path to the keys.

The algorithms themselves aren't the trade-off. The ISM approves one symmetric algorithm, AES, preferably AES-256, and says only the latest version of TLS, TLS 1.3, should be used for connections. End-to-end encrypted services can use the same algorithms; the difference is where the keys live.

Where DekkoCORE fits

DekkoCORE is a zero-knowledge, end-to-end encrypted platform for file sharing and collaboration. Files are encrypted on the user's device with AES-256 keys before they're uploaded, every file has its own key, and DekkoCORE stores only ciphertext. Files are decrypted on the recipient's device as they open them, and not even DekkoSecure can read them. Keys are handled automatically in the background, so users never see a key.

Shares use seven permission levels, from Listing only and View only up to Full permissions, and any share can have an expiry date or be revoked instantly. External Members see only the folders shared with them and can't see other external parties. A secure viewer opens PDF, Office, image and video files in the browser, and View only shares can have downloads turned off. Every view, download, signature, approval and version is logged, and the audit log exports as CSV. Our guide to secure file sharing covers the rest.

Common questions

Frequently Asked Questions

Is encrypted file sharing the same as end-to-end encrypted file sharing?

No. Some services call themselves encrypted because they use TLS and encrypt stored files with keys they hold. End-to-end encrypted file sharing means only the sender and recipients hold the keys, so the provider can't read the files.

Is TLS end-to-end encryption?

Not for file sharing. TLS protects the connection between your device and the provider's server, and RFC 8446 says data on that channel is visible to the endpoints, which include the server.

Can an end-to-end encrypted file sharing service see my files?

Not their contents, if the keys never leave users' devices in readable form. It may still see metadata such as account names, file sizes and when files were shared.

What happens when I revoke access to an end-to-end encrypted file?

Revocation stops the person opening the file through the service from that point on. It can't remove a copy they already downloaded, so for sensitive files use view-only access with downloads turned off where the service supports it.

Can end-to-end encrypted files be previewed and searched?

Yes, but on the user's device or in the browser after decryption, not on the server. A server can't search the contents of files it can't read.

What encryption should an encrypted file sharing service use?

Australia's ISM approves AES for encrypting data, preferably AES-256, and says only the latest version of TLS, TLS 1.3, should be used for connections. End-to-end encryption adds a further condition: the keys stay with users, not the provider.

Like to learn more?

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